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Abstract: A large number of organizations have implemented security or privacy policies through 
classified documents. However, this does not resolve a unitary information within the organization 
and does not complete disclosure of confidential data, according to the hierarchical level that a 
person occupies. For this reason, have been defined policies to control access to information based 
on hierarchies and relations of trust. Policy generation is performed using algorithms and their 
enforcement through an XML-based language. 
Keywords: policies, trust, hierarchies , algorithm, tuples, TAP architecture  
 
Introduction 
One feature of modern organizations, and especially of an e-business organization (1) is the 
distribution of resources. With the transition of business from the traditional model to the electronic 
one, the number of users involved in business operations has increased, and these users (both inside 
and outside the organization) need access to the information of the organization. This information 
produced and circulated by the organization, whether as documents, or reports presented in various 
formats (text, spreadsheet, database), has a specific target group; in other words, "not all information is 
visible to everyone". Hence arises the necessity for designing a security system (2) that can provide 
the desired level of transparency or opacity of the documents that are the object of reports or 
information exchanged between business partners. 
 
Security policies 
The need to define security policies (3) arose when information was grouped into two broad 
categories: 
− classified information, which in turn may be confidential, secret and top secret 
− public information 
In addition, there is code words based system through which information of any type may be subject to 
other restrictions, called compartmental classification (the American version) or multilateral security 
(the European version). For this purpose use: 
- descriptors 
- warning words 
- international defence markers 
All these aspects are scientifically treated through security policies models, grouped in multilevel and 
multilateral security models. 
Security policy (4) consists of a set of measures, supported by management, which provides clear 
rules, but flexible to determine the operations and technologies required to ensure security. 
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A security policy is a document that highlights the main requirements or rules to be known and 
applied for security insurance. 
Security models are important in determining the company's security policy in the computer system. 
Study of the abstract models of security can be determined in understanding of the security 
mechanisms to be applied. 
The security model is a mechanism that implements an established security policy.  
When we refer to an organization's information security, a policy can be represented by several 
elements: 
 - Firewalls used to control access 
 - Routes that circulate information 
 - Access cards, cameras that record everything controlled perimeters 
 - Many other items 
 
Trust authorization policy (TAP) (5) 
We call trust policy set of tuples of the form (ai, ui, em, rn,), defined like: aj is the action permitted to 
be executed by the user ui on the element em based on trust relation rn and where: 
• ui∈ Gi⊆Du is a hierarchy of users which forms a group Gi which belongs to 
the users domain Du.  Table 1 presents, custom hierarchy within an organization 




Data operator u2 
Head department u3 
Head project u4 
Director u5 
Project Manager  u6 
Table 1 – users hierarchy within organization 
• em∈ Ci⊆De is a hierarchy of elements which forms a category Ci which 
belongs to the elements domain De; 
• rn∈R is a trust relations (6) hierarchy; 
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Table 2 – Numerical values assigned to trust relations 
• aj∈A where A is a hierarchy[4] of actions corresponding to relationship 
hierarchy R, and a relation r corresponds to at least one action a,  where a1 <a2 <a3 <a4 <a5 
<a6:  
 a1 = elements reading 
 a2 = create new document  
 a3 = modify document 
 a4 = register document 
 a5 = archive 
 a6 = approval 
The fact that any aj corresponds to a rn, can lead to a simplified definition of policy, as (aj, ui, em), or to a 
detailed definition, as (rn, ui, em). 
Restrictions: We call restriction, limiting a user action on an item or category of items, although he 
had the trust level necessary to accomplish the action. 
There are situations where a user's position within the organization makes it possible action on the 
items by changing their status, which could lead to their alteration or destruction. To prevent such 
situations, measures can be taken to restrict user actions. 
To designate a restriction on an activity, we note with “-aj” a detailed restriction and with “-rn” all the 
restrictive politics. Thus, we have a set of elements (-aj, ui, em) sau (-rn, ui, em). 
 
TAP Arhitecture 
In figure 1 are presented TAP (7) components and interactions between them. 
The core of this architecture is PDP - Policy Decision Point. It receives a request, assumes the 
applicable policy from the PAP (Policy Administration Point), evaluates actions from the point of 
application of policies, evaluates the request and returns an authorization decision to PEP. 
PEP is the Policy Enforcement Point. It receives an access request, extracts actions, generates a TAP 
request and sends it to PDP for evaluation. 
PAP - Policy Administration Point, creates a TAP policy and stores it in a policy database server. 
PIP - Policy Information Point is a component that acts as a server that stores the state matrixes of 
elements and actions can be performed on them and make them available to the PDP. 
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Regarding data access control (8)
as allowed/deny, or in other words, trust/distrust. Therefore, research topic, by refining the approach to 
define hierarchies on access rights
conveyed by the organization, substantially improving reporting needs of all levels.
Future research 
The directions for further development we identified, are:
- improving the developed theory and adding new elements to the trust
policies;  
- the utilisation of the policies generated by TAP as a research base for the 
management of documents by the "state vector " and "path matrix" of a document; 
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Figure 1 TAP Arhitecture 
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